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SEPARATE AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION PROCESSES:
ARE WE BEYOND THEIR USEFULNESS?

BY

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United States Army

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
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**SEPARATE AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION PROCESSES:
ARE WE BEYOND THEIR USEFULNESS?**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Jackson, AD

**Colonel Harvey L. Player
Project Adviser**

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This paper investigates the need for separate authorization and appropriation bills during the budget process. It traces the evolution of the two committees in each House to provide an understanding of their structure and responsibilities. Analyzing the Reagan budgets, it provides the assessment that the Army did not gain a clear advantage from either bill; however, duplication is clearly evident in the budget process. It further provides a negative evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the dual process citing duplication and conflict between the authorization and appropriations committees as the root cause. The paper recommends the need for changing the paradigm; a single process resulting in a single bill would enhance the efficiency and improve the effectiveness of the budget process.

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INTRODUCTION

Many senior military leaders question the need for separate authorization and appropriation processes, especially during the period of Congressional Hearings on the Defense Budget. Is there really a need for separate authorization and appropriation processes at the congressional level to enact a budget and its inherent spending authority? What is the relationship between these two processes? Do they complement each other, compete with each other, interfere with each other, or duplicate each other? Do they streamline the budget process or do they result in a less efficient and less effective budget process? How do they affect the military budget, specifically the Army's budget? Does the Army do better in the authorization or appropriation process? Does the two-step authorization-appropriation process provide any advantage or would a single process be better?

These questions identify the very foundation of this paper. The purpose of this paper is to determine the usefulness of separate authorization and appropriation functions in the budget process. A threefold approach is used: first, to provide an understanding of how this dual process evolved; second, to determine how well the product of this dual process serves the Army; and third, to assess the effect this dual process has on efficiency and effectiveness.

A historical perspective provides the basis for the evolution of each of the processes and the resulting relationship between the two. By understanding this evolution, we gain

insight to better appreciate the current roles played by these two processes.

An analysis of the authorization and appropriation processes during the Reagan budget years provides the basis for a determination of the benefit the Army derived from this dual process. This analysis looks at the Procurement; Operations and Maintenance; and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDTE) accounts. These accounts are integral to all three documents: the President's budget proposal, the authorization bill, and the appropriation bill. Therefore, they allow for an assessment of both the relationship between the two bills and the relationship between each bill and the President's budget proposal. They also provide a look at the advantages and disadvantages inherent with a dual process. The authorized and appropriated percentages of the President's budget proposal, restrictions imposed by legislative language, and disconnects between the language in both bills serve as criteria.

Finally, assessments of the effect on the timeliness of budget approval, the level of spending authority, the amount of Army man-hours expended, and the focus of congressional oversight, provide the basis for determining the impact this dual process of separate authorization and appropriation actions has on contemporary efficiency and effectiveness.

THE PROCESS

A starting point for common understanding is a set of definitions. These definitions lay the foundation for the committee system. Authorization is defined as

...the basic substantive legislation enacted by Congress that sets up or continues the legal operation of a Federal program or agency. Such legislation includes manpower and is normally a prerequisite for subsequent appropriations. It does not usually provide budget authority.¹

Appropriation is defined as

...an authorization by Congress to incur obligations for specified purposes and to make subsequent payments out of the U.S. Treasury. An appropriation is classified as being annual, multi-year, or continuing depending on the period of time that it is available for obligation.²

Congress created the committee system to aid in performing its legislative responsibilities. One of the factors that led to the desirability of a committee structure was the "...practice of distinguishing within the legislative process between the authorization or acceptance of the policy provisions implicit in legislative proposals and the allocation or appropriation of money to implement such proposals."³

The Senate and House Armed Services Committees became Standing Committees in 1816 and 1822, respectively. At that time, however, each consisted of two committees, Military Affairs and Naval Affairs. Not until 1947 and the new "National Military Establishment" did these committees combine to become the Committee on Armed Services.⁴ Specifically, these committees

were "...established as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, [and] have jurisdiction over all legislative measures pertaining to the common defense and the armed forces generally."⁵

Appropriations Committees became Standing Committees in the House and Senate in 1865 and 1867, respectively.⁶ They came about as a result of the workload inherent with an increased number of general appropriation bills. Beginning in 1792, the Finance Committee in the Senate and the Ways and Means Committee in the House handled responsibilities for both revenue and spending bills. By 1837, the number of appropriation bills had grown to four. A decentralization of financial control became necessary with the increased burden.⁷ These fiscal committees "...exercise the power of the purse in order to implement the constitutional requirement that no money can be drawn from the Treasury except by appropriations made by law."⁸

"Beginning in 1877, however, the [House] Appropriations Committee lost much of its power when functional committees were allowed to recommend appropriations for the departments with which they were concerned..."⁹ The Appropriations Committee lost responsibility for appropriation bills dealing with the Army and Navy in 1885; they became the jurisdiction of the Military and Naval Affairs Committees, respectively. House members' dissatisfaction with the independence of the Appropriations Committee was the primary reason for this action.¹⁰

Similar action took place in the Senate in 1899. The Senate Appropriations Committee's "...powers were severely limited when other committees were allowed to pass on the appropriations of the administrative agencies with which they were concerned."¹¹

The result of this decentralization of responsibility for appropriations "...was the prevention of study of the national financial problem as a whole, the loss of all unified responsibility for national spending, and the encouragement of reckless spending."¹² A need for significant change existed. This change came about with the formulation and passing of the Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921. The House Appropriations Committee regained jurisdiction, from eight different committees, over all general appropriation bills by an Amendment of House Rules on June 1, 1920. Likewise, the Senate Appropriations Committee regained its control over appropriation bills by an elaborate amendment of the Senate Rule on March 6, 1922.¹³

However, members of the Senate, especially those serving on legislative committees, expressed great opposition to the centralizing of power in the Appropriations Committee. The basis of their opposition lay in their concern regarding technical advice and consistency between the appropriation bills and other related legislation.¹⁴ Increasing the role of the legislative committees lessened this concern.

The Armed Services Committees, beginning in 1946,

"...fulfilled [their] authorization role only by providing 'general, continuing authorizations' to support all programs of the military departments...Accordingly, the

concept of a division of labor was more theoretical than real as the annual authorization of specific line items was in essence provided through appropriation acts...In terms of both dollars and subject matter under direct annual cognizance of the Armed Services Committees, the Committees' authority appears to have been extremely limited.¹⁵

Between 1959 and 1982, increased jurisdiction for annual authorizations to the Armed Services Committees strengthened the relationship between annual authorization and Department of Defense (DoD) appropriations. This period saw all requirements for the annual authorizing of funds for appropriation enacted into law and codified. Currently, the law requires, among others, annual authorization of appropriations for all procurement accounts, all operation and maintenance accounts, and the research, development, test, and evaluation account.¹⁶ "It should be noted that the 1961 bill which initiated the authorization procedures was a product of Armed Services-Appropriations Committee conflict."¹⁷

In the House, the Appropriations Committee's decisions

...are expected to conform broadly to expenditure patterns established by authorization statutes. And any particular authorization is expected to circumscribe the Committee's decision-making freedom...When, however, the Committee confronts a budget request for an appropriation to support an authorized program, its decisions are expected to have a marginal or incremental effect on the program.¹⁸

"As one Member said, 'The Appropriations Committee should check into waste and inefficiency and they should decide whether too

much money has been authorized to meet the goals of the program." ¹⁹

These two processes were designed to complement each other. Former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Bray, described it well in 1962, "Everything that the Appropriations Committee does is justified by an authorization. We write the prescription. The Appropriations Committee fills the prescription in its Appropriations." ²⁰

Currently, the appropriations procedure is supposed to be a two-step authorization-appropriation procedure:

...instead of approving funding authority directly, Congress first enacts specific authorizing legislation. This task falls to the legislative (or authorizing) committees in both Houses. These committees provide substantive review of...[Army] proposals and recommend legislation that authorizes... particular programs and activities...Once programs are authorized, they receive their required funds through separate appropriations legislation. This process entails further review of...[Army] proposals and performance. ²¹

However, in reality, the two processes are overlapping functions in an uncoordinated manner. Appropriations are doing more legislating, and Armed Services are doing more "budgeteering." ²²

For example,

the Appropriation Act is not supposed to provide any law, just a detailed spending plan. However, it often stipulates what the money must be spent for and, more importantly, what it cannot be spent for. This sometimes causes friction between the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. ²³

The Army interfaces the congressional budget review procedure during budget justification. As the authorization and appropriations committees of both houses of Congress analyze the Army portion of the President's budget proposal, senior Army officials testify at committee hearings.

Usually appearing jointly before each of the four committees, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff present the Army posture statement. They report the status of Army programs, identify objectives, and describe capabilities. In subsequent hearings, the Director of the Army Budget briefs each committee on the budget. As scheduled by a particular committee, he is followed by program and appropriation directors, who testify regarding individual programs and estimates.²⁴

Army Staff liaison is maintained with both the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of both Houses, the Director of the Army Budget with the appropriators and the Chief of Legislative Liaison with the authorizers. This liaison provides an important link in the process. Among other responsibilities, it ensures timely response to congressional inquiries and reviews committee reports for applicable legislative intent.

THE PRODUCT

To determine the amount of benefit this dual process provides the Army, it is necessary to make a comparison of past years' Authorization and Appropriation Acts. The period, fiscal years 1982 through 1989, is the focus of this analysis based on

the significant gains accomplished by military budgets directly influenced by the Reagan presidency.

A summary of authorization and funding of Army procurement appropriations follows:

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Requested (000)</u>	<u>Authorized (000)</u>	<u>Appropriated (000)</u>
1982 ²⁵	13,930,500		14,021,371
1983	17,868,474	17,053,300	15,656,316
1984	19,195,100	18,052,600	17,391,479
1985	21,059,800	19,797,400	19,724,750
1986	21,366,100	20,032,300	19,782,888
1987	18,578,500	16,240,853	15,979,752
1988	16,150,097	16,763,121	15,983,071
1989	15,120,500	15,318,382	14,898,402 ²⁶

Throughout this period the appropriation process consistently reduced the overall procurement funding below that authorized to be appropriated. This gives the impression that the appropriation process fulfilled its responsibility of ensuring affordability and, thereby, was of less benefit to the Army. However, an in-depth look into the size of the overall reductions, the funding for individual procurement accounts, and specific legislative language show that the difference between the two bills, in the aggregate, was not significant.

Except for fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1988, the level of funding appropriated remained within two percentage points of that authorized. The 1984 appropriation, although four percent lower than authorized, funded over 90 percent of the President's

budget proposal. In 1988, the appropriation provided 99 percent of the requested funds. In fact, appropriations funded over 90 percent of the President's budget proposal during six years of this period. The authorization process set the tone for the level of procurement funding during the majority of this period; the appropriation process followed that lead.

Funding for individual procurement accounts is also revealing. During this period, appropriations for individual procurement accounts met or exceeded authorizations on seven different occasions. The fiscal year 1985 appropriation increased the Aircraft and Ammunition accounts by \$89 million and \$307 million, respectively. Fiscal year 1987 increased the Aircraft, Missile, and Other Procurement accounts by \$37 million, \$56 million, and \$6 million, respectively.

Authorizations met or exceeded the President's budget proposal on nine occasions; appropriations did likewise on eight of these occasions and also exceeded the request on one additional occasion. Additionally, in every case, except one, that the authorization reduced the request in excess of 10 percent, the appropriation exceeded the authorization.

Both authorization and appropriation bills show a pattern of legislative restrictions. Appropriation bills, in particular, have legislated funding restrictions above that mandated in the authorization bill; this is present in appropriation bills throughout this period. The legislative language either restricted spending authority to specific programs, which the

authorization bill did not require, or changed restrictive language of the authorization bill.

These stated restrictions limit the Defense Department and the Army from moving funds to another program within the same appropriation category. It requires the Defense Department to obtain prior approval from Congress to utilize restricted funds on another procurement program. Without the stated restriction, the Defense Department has the authority to internally reprogram funds within the same appropriation category as long as the action is not constrained by dollar thresholds.²⁷

The fiscal year 1982 appropriation bill used such language to restrict \$1.9 million for the 9mm handgun. The House Appropriations Committee included this language to clearly demonstrate the intent of Congress concerning standardization of handguns and handgun ammunition.²⁸

The fiscal year 1983 appropriation bill restricted a total of \$422 million. Of this amount, the bill provided \$10 million specifically for six C-12 cargo aircraft to the Army National Guard.²⁹ This funding exceeded the President's budget proposal.

In fiscal year 1984, restrictions limited a total of \$2.9 billion, almost 20 percent of the combined procurement appropriations. An \$885 million restriction to the Patriot program reflected Congress' recognition of the importance of the system.³⁰ The Stinger program's \$105 million restriction "eased the transition" from the basic to improved versions by "smoothing the production rate."³¹

The fiscal year 1985 appropriation bill legislated \$4.2 billion in restrictions, over 20 percent of total procurement appropriations. Additionally, the procurement of eighteen AH-64 Apache attack helicopters for the Army National Guard was a proviso for all aircraft procurement funding.³² This restriction was in accordance with authorizing legislation intent.³³ The language reiterates 1984 House Appropriations Committee direction "that the Army plan to begin integration of the AH-64 into the National Guard [starting in fiscal year 1986]."³⁴

The UH-60/EH-60 restriction of \$643 million provided funding for multi-year procurement of eight UH-60 helicopters above the requested quantity (two more than authorized³⁵). These additional helicopters were for the Army National Guard, four to the Alaskan National Guard and four as replacements to the Customs Service for drug interdiction use.³⁶ The bill's restriction of \$32 million for the Chaparral program was in accordance "...with the authorized acceleration by 1 year of the introduction of the Chaparral system into the Army Guard..."³⁷ The President's budget proposal did not request this program.

In fiscal year 1986, both bills provided restrictive language. Appropriation bill restrictions amounted to \$8.3 billion. This comprises over 40 percent of the total and \$3.1 billion more than the authorization bill imposed. The Stinger program restriction of \$259 million exceeded authorization, but reflected the Appropriations Conference Committee's concern regarding a shortage of air defense assets since the DIVAD

cancellation. However, the Army needed authorization before obligating or expending these funds.³⁸

Both fiscal year 1987 bills included restrictive language. The authorization bill restricted the use of \$5.2 billion in other procurement. The appropriation bill restriction on the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon reflected Congress' belief that competitive procurement "is feasible, in the best interest of the Government, and will ensure the best producer is selected..."³⁹

In fiscal year 1988, authorization restrictions amounted to \$5.5 billion and included specific procurement restrictions on the ADATS program. The appropriation restrictions mirrored authorizing language but reduced authorized funding. Additionally, it removed restrictions on the ADATS program imposed by the authorization bill.

The authorization bill prohibited obligating or expending funds for ADATS unless the system met or exceeded full system requirements.⁴⁰ The bill included this prohibition to ensure that DIVAD program mistakes were not repeated; the Army's acquisition plan for ADATS did not require adequate testing prior to awarding a contract for procurement.⁴¹

In contrast, the appropriation bill allowed funding for ADATS "without regard to the restrictions contained in...the...Authorization Act for fiscal year 1988"⁴² It recognized the Army's "speed and thoroughness" in complying with a 1987 appropriations committee directive to field an adequate air defense system. Further, it emphasized the need to "...begin

production...[to] meet the near term requirements, while operational testing proceeds in parallel" and it set aside authorization restrictions.⁴³ Again, in 1989, the appropriation bill funded the ADATS program "...without regard to the restrictions contained in the...Authorization Act for fiscal year 1988."⁴⁴ This clearly was to the advantage of the Army.

A summary of authorization and funding of Army operation and maintenance appropriations follows:

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Requested (000)</u>	<u>Authorized (000)</u>	<u>Appropriated (000)</u>
1982	16,863,600	17,024,044	16,783,997
1983	18,937,643	18,621,839	17,748,076
1984	19,428,600	19,388,791	18,908,886
1985	21,606,611	20,789,266	20,559,771
1986	22,575,430	21,583,231	21,381,407
1987	23,921,870	22,530,794	22,526,812
1988	24,861,649	24,286,497	23,567,287
1989	24,677,100	24,700,000	24,849,396

In every year except 1989, the appropriation process reduced the overall operation and maintenance funding below that authorized to be appropriated. This, also, gives the impression that the appropriation process fulfilled its responsibility of ensuring affordability and, thereby, was of less benefit to the Army. As with the procurement accounts, an in-depth look into the size of the overall reductions and the funding for individual operation and maintenance accounts show that the reserve components of the Army benefitted through the appropriation process.

In concert with procurement funding, the level of funding appropriated for all years except fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1988, remained within two percentage points of that authorized. The 1983 appropriation, although four percent lower than authorized, funded over 93 percent of the President's budget proposal. In 1984 and 1988, the appropriation provided 97 and 95 percent, respectively, of the requested funds. In fact, appropriations funded at least 94 percent of the President's budget proposal throughout this period. The authorization process set the tone for the level of operation and maintenance funding during this period; again, the appropriation process followed that lead.

Funding for individual accounts follow the same pattern. During this period, appropriations for individual operation and maintenance accounts met or exceeded authorization on six different occasions; all of these cases were in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard accounts. Authorizations met or exceeded the President's budget proposal on 11 occasions; appropriations did likewise on nine of these occasions. Again, all cases were in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard accounts.

Restrictive language relating to operations and maintenance is uncommon during this period. Authorization bills in fiscal years 1984 and 1985 restricted the majority of funding to specific programs. However, authorization bills discontinued this practice after 1985. The majority of appropriation restrictive language, above that mandated in the authorization

bill, reflected restrictions specifically requested in the President's budget proposal.

A summary of authorization and funding of the Army research, development, test, and evaluation appropriation follows:

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Requested (000)</u>	<u>Authorized (000)</u>	<u>Appropriated (000)</u>
1982	3,768,500	3,746,299	3,609,535
1983	4,533,778	3,926,367	3,879,683
1984	4,793,674	4,204,552	4,199,125
1985	4,987,100	4,546,675	4,349,015
1986	5,279,900	4,848,663	4,798,172
1987	5,550,300	4,712,729	4,555,076
1988	5,511,172	5,281,008	4,687,513
1989	5,030,700	5,198,444	5,130,166

Throughout this period the appropriation process consistently reduced the overall procurement funding below that authorized to be appropriated. The appropriation process fulfilled its responsibility of ensuring affordability and, thereby, was of less benefit to the Army. In fact, appropriations reduced the President's budget proposal over 10 percent almost twice as often as the authorization process. In 1988, the cut was 10 percent below the authorized level. Furthermore, specific legislative language supports this pattern.

As with the procurement accounts, both authorization and appropriation bills show a pattern of legislative restrictions. Appropriation bills, in particular, legislated funding restrictions above that mandated in the authorization bill. The

legislative language restricted spending authority to specific programs, which the authorization bill did not require. Fiscal year 1984's authorization restricted \$113 million to specific programs.

In fiscal year 1985, authorization restricted \$1.3 million. Appropriations further restricted \$13 million for the 120-millimeter Mortar as a consequence of Authorization Act language requiring selection of a contractor for this program during the fiscal year; the President did not request this program. The appropriation bill provided this restrictive language to ensure accomplishment of the authorization bill requirement and to expedite acquisition.⁴⁵

Fiscal years 1986 and 1987 authorizations restricted \$157 million and \$49 million, respectively, for specific programs. No additional restrictions resulted from the appropriation bills.

In fiscal year 1988, authorization restrictions amounted to \$36 million. The appropriation imposed restrictions of \$191 million over the authorization bill for nutrition research activities, the Army Tactical Missile System, and Electronic Warfare programs.

Restrictions above the authorization bill in fiscal year 1989 amounted to \$17 million for the 120-millimeter Mortar System, the vehicular intercommunications system, and fluidtronics technology. The restrictive language for the 120-millimeter mortar reflected an urgent Army requirement; the Army required the program's funding in fiscal year 1989.⁴⁶ Language

for vehicular intercommunications provided funding for source selection costs; it reflected a level of congressional interest that directed prior notification of any reductions.⁴⁷

Restrictions for fluidtronics technology reflected congressional concern "...that this technology may be lost if the Army continues to pursue it at such a slow pace."⁴⁸

Overall, the Army did not gain a clear advantage from either the authorization or appropriation process. Both processes used funding limitations and restrictive language to provide congressional control over programs and related spending authority. In a few cases, the dual process allowed a higher level of funding or removal of a restriction; this was clearly the exception. What has become evident, however, is the duplication inherent in the separate authorization and appropriation processes.

THE EFFECT

The impact on several criteria provides the means to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the current dual process. Timeliness of budget approval is the first criterion to assess this impact. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 reformed, but did not alter, the authorization-appropriation process within Congress. The Act provided a timetable to increase the likelihood of completing action on appropriation bills before the start of the fiscal year. This timetable required the enactment of specific

authorizing legislation before approving funding authority; May 15 was set as the deadline for reporting authorizations. After authorization, separate appropriation action would fund programs by September 25.⁴⁹

Congress has shown great difficulty in complying with this timetable. In fact, in the period since passage of this law, Congress completed action on the Defense Appropriation Bill within the timetable provisions only twice, the first two years after it took effect. Since then, "...delayed action on appropriation bills has become the norm."⁵⁰ The appropriations committees habitually blame their noncompliance on authorizing legislation delays.⁵¹

In some instances, "Congress has inserted provisions of reported (but not enacted) authorizations into regular appropriations."⁵² Thus, the appropriators do not always fully benefit from the final work of the authorizing committees and the authorizing legislation. In fact, with the exception of fiscal year 1986, the two bills moved through Congress almost simultaneously during the past eight years; each year it appears to get worse. In fiscal year 1992, the appropriation bill became law before the authorization bill. These delays occur because more members of Congress and more committees are involved in the budget review process. The impact on timeliness is negative because "the delay in passing DoD appropriations injects uncertainty into the Pentagon's planning, which increases the likelihood of wasteful spending."⁵³

The second criterion is level of spending authority. With the exception of RDTE, the analysis of the Reagan budgets shows that most action by the appropriators was in line with the authorizers. In most instances, the appropriators did their job of looking "critically at the particulars of the authorized programs and par[ing] the amounts authorized down to more realistic figures."⁵⁴ When authorizations appeared excessively low, the appropriators took action to correct this perceived shortcoming. This leads to two specific areas that have put the appropriators in conflict with the authorizers.

The first area of conflict is appropriating more funds than prescribed by the authorization law. Since authorizers evaluate programs for merit, they should determine the maximum amount of money that is needed to support the program. Several examples of this are evident during the Reagan budget years; the fiscal year 1986 Stinger program appropriation provides a good example.

The second area of conflict is the practice of appropriators legislating conditions into the appropriation bill or legislating a contradiction to the intent and purpose of the authorizers. Numerous examples exist of legislating conditions in the appropriation bill. Fiscal years 1988 and 1989 ADATS legislation provide examples of appropriations contradicting the authorization legislation. Even with these authorization-appropriation conflicts, the overall impact on spending authority is negative because restrictions on spending authority are

significantly increased under the dual process without the benefit of significantly increased funding.

The third criterion is Army man-hours expended. The dual process involves many actions during budget justification.

Committees and subcommittees have extensive hearings, issue detailed reports, request reports, and commission investigations... While not having the direct force of law, these congressional committee report requirements are not ignored... Also, committee reports often are used to clarify or spell out the 'intent of Congress.'⁵⁵

Testimony before hearings require duplicity in preparation, presence, and follow-up review and editing of testimony.

President Eisenhower noted these consequences in 1961; "...he complained of an anticipated duplication of Congressional review and the potential heavy burden on the time of executive personnel."⁵⁶

Liaison must also be effected with both the authorization and appropriations committees. Twice the number of committee reports must be reviewed for legislative intent. Queries from two sets of committees must be answered by the Army staff. This work is compounded by the fact that each of the four committees has a large staff. "It is clear that...a lot of time and effort [is spent] responding to the legislative branch staffs."⁵⁷ These examples reveal only the "tip of the iceberg" concerning man-hours expended to respond to the dual process. The impact of man-hours is clearly negative; these additional man-hours could be conserved or spent more usefully on other efforts.

The final criterion is the focus of congressional oversight of defense policy. "Expansion of the authorization process...has dramatically increased the opportunities members of Congress have to alter defense programs."⁵⁸ The current process, however, encourages legislators to spend more time on the defense "budget," rather than on defense "policy."⁵⁹ With the increased scope of annual authorizations, more effort is put towards scrutiny of budget line items by both committees.

The tendency of the authorizing committees is to "protect turf," and "turf" equates to an increased number of budget line items that impact on military readiness and sustainability. In essence, "dollars are policy."⁶⁰ This view results in a tendency to focus on "resource" questions rather than "strategic planning."⁶¹ As Edward Luttwak writes, "...the whole focus of the review to which the Pentagon's budget is subjected...is on the cost-accounting and legal details rather than on the purpose and meaning of our defense decisions."⁶² An unnamed member of the House Armed Services Committee gave this supporting opinion: "...we should be concerned with a proper overall defense policy and its match with our foreign policy...There is too much line itemizing and detail on Armed Services."⁶³

This focus leads to what some describe as congressional "micromanagement" of the defense budget. The resulting impact of congressional oversight is negative;

micromanagement frustrates DoD's ability to plan because so many line items are changed...and the amount of change generally is unknown until after the fiscal year

begins. Moreover, in many instances micromanagement protects programs that are unjustified either economically or militarily. Both consequences add to defense costs.⁶⁴

The overall effect of the current authorization-appropriation procedure, according to the criteria used, is negative. This effect results from a competitiveness between the two processes for influence and a duplication of each other's work.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Separate authorization and appropriation processes do not provide the Army any significant benefit. Quite the contrary; they lead to duplicative and detailed budget scrutiny by an increasing number of members of Congress. The result is a slow and uncertain process that increases the workload for all participants, provides different and sometimes contradictory results, and requires "Congress...to make decisions on defense requests twice each year."⁶⁵

Such an inefficient and ineffective system has negative implications for the Army in the current and future environment of shrinking resources and military cut-backs. Old paradigms may have to go by the wayside to get the most for the dollar. As Robert J. Art has written,

in both the House and the Senate, the Armed Services and Defense Appropriations Subcommittees overlap heavily in their functions, but remain fairly uncoordinated in their actions. The Defense Appropriations Subcommittees are doing more legislating; the Armed Services Committees are doing more 'budgeteering.' Both continue to operate autonomously. This raises the question of whether the original rationales of specialization of function and division of labor through separate authorizing and appropriating committees still make sense for defense.⁶⁶

William Morrow goes one step farther in describing the necessary change to the current dual process:

the dividing line between authorization and appropriations appears to be an artificial one and, though legislators find some

practical and political advantage to such a division, the disadvantages may outweigh the advantages. Many suggestions for congressional reform. .. involve organizational changes which would enable standing committees to obtain a more generalized, integrated overview of functional policy areas. If this is indeed the hope of future committee vitality, there ought to be some thought given to the possibility of merging the two stages.⁶⁷

The clear message sent by both of these men is that change is necessary. The question becomes, what kind of change?

A change to a single process which results in a single bill makes the most sense. It would enhance efficiency by improving timeliness, reducing man-hours, and producing one pool of defense experts. It would increase the effectiveness of the process by removing a great deal of uncertainty, providing a sense of direction, and allowing time to look at defense policy from a macro view. This change would not mean less justification of the budget submission and higher funding levels. Nor would it result in appropriation bills free of congressional restrictions on spending. It would, however, remove the duplication and conflict that constitute a root cause for inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the budget process.

ENDNOTES

1. Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, Planning, Programing, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) Handbook (General Research Corporation, June 1982), T-6 (hereafter referred to as "PPBES Handbook").
2. Ibid., T-2.
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4. Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1950), x.
5. Harry W. Stephens, "The Role of the Legislative Committees in the Appropriations Process: A Study Focused on the Armed Services Committees," The Western Political Quarterly XXIV:1 (March 1971): 146.
6. George Goodwin, Jr., The Little Legislatures (The University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), 4-5.
7. George H. Haynes, The Senate of the United States I (New York: Russell & Russell, 1960), 457-58.
8. Lees, 17.
9. Goodwin, 10-11.
10. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), 43.
11. Goodwin, 12.
12. Haynes, 458.
13. Ibid., 458-60.
14. Ibid., 459.
15. Stephens, 146-47.
16. Senate Armed Services Committee, Committee Report No. 97-330, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 182-83.
17. Edward J. Laurance, The Changing Role of Congress in Defense Policy-Making (High Wycomb, England: University Microfilms, 1973), 46.

18. Fenno, 7.
19. Ibid., 23.
20. House Armed Services Committee, Hearings, Military Construction Authorization, FY 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 4750.
21. PPBES Handbook, 2-30 - 2-31.
22. Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: Enhancing Policy Oversight," Political Science Quarterly 100:2 (Summer 1985): 228.
23. Extract from "Federal Budget" instructor notes belonging to Colonel Craig E. Sooy, USMC, used while teaching at the Naval War College, 1989-91. Colonel Sooy is currently the Marine Corps Representative at the Army War College.
24. PPBES Handbook, 7-26.
25. Authorizations for the Ammunition and Other Procurement accounts were not made until Fiscal Year 1983. This was a new requirement of the 1982 Department of Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 97-86).
26. Funds for procurement of Army National Guard and Army Reserve equipment were not identified by separate lines in the 1989 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (Public Law 100-463). The Act provided funding of \$1.1 billion for Reserve and National Guard equipment of the armed forces.
27. PPBES Handbook, 8-12 - 8-13.
28. House Appropriations Committee, Committee Report No. 97-333, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 199.
29. House of Representatives, Conference Report No. 97-980, Making Further Continuing Appropriations and Providing for Productive Employment for the Fiscal year Ending September 30, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 114.
30. House of Representatives, Conference Report No. 98-567, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal year Ending September 30, 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 85 (hereafter referred to as "Conference Report No. 98-567"); Senate, Conference Report No. 98-213, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 109.

31. Conference Report No. 98-567, 85.
32. Public Law 98-473. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 98th Congress - Second Session 1984 2 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1985), 98 STAT. 1910.
33. Legislative History, Public Law 98-525. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 98th Congress - Second Session, 1984 4 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1985), 4260-61.
34. House Appropriations Committee, Committee Report No. 98-1086, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 104.
35. House of Representatives, Conference Committee Report No. 98-1080, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 185.
36. House of Representatives, Conference Report No. 98-1159, Making Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 321; Senate Appropriations Committee, Committee Report No. 98-636, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 69.
37. Senate Appropriation Committee, Committee Report No. 98-636, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 72.
38. House of Representatives, Conference Committee Report No. 99-443, Making Further Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 181-82.
39. House of Representatives, Conference Committee Report No. 99-1005, Making Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 488.
40. Public Law 100-180. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 100th Congress - First Session 1987 1 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1988), 101 STAT. 1036.
41. Legislative History, Public Law 100-180. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 100th Congress - First Session 1987 3 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1988), 1040; Legislative History, House Conference Report No. 100-446. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 100th Congress - First Session 1987 3 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1988), 1380.

42. Public Law 100-202. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 100th Congress - First Session 1987 1 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1988), 101 STAT. 1329-51.
43. House of Representatives, Conference Report No. 100-498, Making Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 555.
44. Public Law 100-463. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 100th Congress - Second Session 1988 2 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1989), 102 STAT. 2270-7.
45. Conference Committee Report No. 98-1159, 363-64; Committee Report no. 98-1086, 207.
46. House Appropriations Committee, Committee Report No. 100-681, Department Of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1989 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 154.
47. Ibid., 89-90; 155.
48. Ibid., 155-56.
49. PPBES Handbook, 7-24.
50. Budget Reform Proposals (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985), 12.
51. Allen Schick, Crisis in the Budget Process (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1986), 46.
52. Ibid., 41.
53. James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Defense Policy: 1961 to 1986," Armed Forces & Society 13:3 (Spring 1987): 388.
54. William L. Morrow, Congressional Committees (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), 26.
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56. Bernard K. Gordon, "The Military Budget: Congressional Phase," The Journal of Politics 23:4 (November 1961): 696.
57. Baker, 9.
58. Lindsay, 383.
59. Ibid., 388.

60. Gordon, 695.
61. Lindsay, 391.
62. Edward N. Luttwak, "Why We Need More 'Waste, Fraud and Mismanagement' in the Pentagon," Congressional Record (25 March 1982): 5571. Senator Armstrong submitted this article for printing in the Record.
63. Art, 235.
64. Lindsay, 391.
65. Ibid., 376.
66. Art, 228.
67. Morrow, 28.

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